Columbus

Für einen MBA Kurs, den ich nächste Woche für ein Firmen internes Programm bei Nestlé halten werde, habe ich das Thema Netzwerkorganisation und virtuelle Organisationen aufbereitet. Dabei habe ich auch die Forschungsergebnisse des Domino Projekts wieder hervorgeholt, entstaubt und festgestellt, dass diese Resultate noch immer sehr relevant sind. Die Essenz aus dem Abschlussbuch habe ich hier zusammengestellt (PDF, 500kb).

Mein letzter Post handelte von Spinnen und Seestern Organisationen. Meine Ansicht ist klar: In einem sich stark verändernden Umfeld (z.B. local search) sind traditionelle hierarchisch organisierte Firmen zu langsam, zu wenig flexibel und im Sinn der Schumpeter'schen kreativen Destruktion nicht überlebensfähig. Es braucht andere Formen von Organisation, z.B. Value Webs. Damals habe ich das so gesehen:

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Das Model eines Value Web

„They leverage the strengths of each link in the value chain, improve efficiencies, reduce expenses, and focus on the interoperability of process and supporting systems.“ [1]

Die verschiedenen Stufen im Prozess der Wertkreation wurden oft als Wertkette definiert [2]. Diese Sicht der Wertkette behandelt Information als unterstützendes Element. Das Management sammelt, verarbeitet und entscheidet aufgrund von Informationen über Warenbestand, Produktion, Bestellungen und Logistik. Überraschend viele dieser Prozesse lassen sich in digitalen Medien abbilden. Rayport und Sviokla [3] sprechen vom Marketspace und von eigentlich zwei Wertketten, der physischen – traditionellen – Wertkette und der virtuellen Wertkette (Virtual Value Chain). Während die traditionelle Wertkette linear ist, kann die Virtuelle Wertkette eher mit einem Netz verglichen werden, die in jedem Punkt zugänglich und konfigurierbar ist.

Der Value Web Broker – ein Wertvermittler

Der zentrale Punkt des Value Web Models ist der Value Web Broker, oder Wertvermittler. Als zentraler Intermediär übernimmt er die Kombination von Komponenten und fügt sie zum finalen Produkt zusammen. Als Beispiel dient E*Trade, der online Finanzanbieter, der Zugang zur Börse, Kontokorrent, Hypotheken, Finanzinformationen und weitere Finanzdienstleistungen anbietet. Die Dienstleistungen werden nicht selber hergestellt, sondern sind gebündelte Drittprodukte, die unter dem Dach von E*Trade verkauft werden. E*Trade gilt als vertrauenswürdiger Intermediär ohne eigene spezifische Produktinteressen und wird deshalb von Kunden als Partner geschätzt.

Das Value Web Model [4], S – Zulieferanten, EM Platform – elektronischer Markt

Eine loyale und enge Beziehung mit Kunden

Ein wichtiges Glied im Value Web ist die sehr enge Beziehung mit dem Kunden. Sicher, über Kundenbindung gibt es ganze Bibliotheken an Fachliteratur und guten Vorschlägen, wie so etwas zu bewerkstelligen ist. Im Internet erfährt die ganze Diskussion eine neue Wende, denn eine oft rein digitale Beziehung setzt andere Anforderungen an deren Ausgestaltung. Dell Computers, als Beispiel, lässt den Kunden das Produkt nach seinen eigenen Wünschen und Bedürfnissen zusammenstellen. Der Kunde wird so ein Teil des Wertsystems von Dell.

Bestehende Wertketten werden in mannigfaltige Geschäfte aufgespalten, von denen jedes seine eigenen Quellen für einen Wettbewerbsvorteil haben wird. Wenn einzelne Funktionen unterschiedliche Grössen- oder Verbundvorteile aufweisen, ist die resultierende Wertkette immer ein Kompromiss – eine Durchschnittsberechnung aller Effekte. Das Aufbrechen der einzelnen Komponenten in ihre Einzelteile und deren Rekonfiguration in einem Value Web erlaubt einige dieser Effekte zu reduzieren, da die jeweils passenden Produktkomponenten durch den Wertvermittler in einer flexiblen Form zusammengefügt werden.

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[1] Bleeker S., “The Virtual Organization”, The Futurist, March-April 1994, pp. 9-14.

[2] Porter M., Competitive Advantage, New York: The Free Press, 1985.

[3] Rayport J. and Sviokla J., “Managing in the Marketspace”, Harvard Business Review, November - December 1994, pp. 141-150.

[4] Selz D., Value Webs – Emerging forms of fluid and flexible organizations, St.Gallen: Dissertation University of St.Gallen, 1999.

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Natürlich ist man mit solchen Gedanken von "flüssigen" Organisationen nicht allein. Und natürlich hat sich seither viel getan. Besagter Artikel am Anfang des Posts verweist auf ein aktuelles Buch. Ein anderes interessantes Beispiel ist Ricardo Semmler's Semco. Ein brasilianisches Unternehmen, das seit Jahren zeigt, dass echte Anteilnahme am Betriebsgeschehen der beste Garant für kurz- wie langfristigen Erfolg ist.

Plötzlich können Dinge ganz rasch gehen. Soeben lese ich in BBC Online, dass EMI sich bereit erklärt ab, sofort sogenannte "Premium Tracks" ohne DRM (Digital Rights Management) im iTunes Store anzubieten. Wie hier an andere Stelle schon dargelegt, ist ein mögliches Erfolgsszenario ein Music Value Web. Bisher habe ich gemeint, die Musik Industrie hat sie nicht alle. Von Steve Jobs - von Andreas gut dokumentiert - wurde im Februar gefordert, die Musik DRM frei zu machen. Einige dachten es sei ein Manöver. Doch es geht hier um mehr. Zitat vom EMI Boss Eric Nicoli:

"We have to trust our consumers. We have always argued that the best way to combat illegal traffic is to make legal content available at decent value and convenient."

Na endlich. Es geht um Kunden, um uns genau genommen. Um unseren Umgang mit Musik und Musikern. Hat nur 10 Jahre gedauert und viele unnötig verpasste Chancen. Mir tun die Musiker leid, die 10 Jahre verpasst haben.

The (academic) debate about the impact of IT and, in particular, the Web has been characterized over the years by two dichotomies: markets vs. hierarchies and dis- vs. re-intermediation. Funny to see that the main lines of argument in some cases predate the arrival of the Internet for the public-at-large.

Market vs. Hierarchy

Malone et al. (1987) used and applied transaction cost economics to argue that in-creased use of IT will facilitate a "move-to-the-market". Reduced information and co-ordination cost, better possibilities of product representation, standardization effects etc. will give market-like coordination a comparative cost advantage over hierarchical coordination.

This argument has been challenged in the following years by a number of authors which have added further factors that need to be considered such as non-contractible issues, e.g. quality and trust, relationship-specific in-vestments, small number bargaining, product attributes, and demand and technological uncertainty.

Consequently one might hypothesize for a move-to-the-middle, i.e. a growing importance of network relations. In addition, and in partial contrast to the predominantly economic reasoning some argue that the coordination form chosen by companies is less the result of transaction cost assessment but rather the result of strategic decisions.

Dis- vs. Reintermediation

As the Web has brought a much wider and faster proliferation of E-Commerce than many of the protagonists have anticipated, the focus of debate has shifted somewhat from the issue market vs. hierarchy to the question of dis- vs. rei-ntermediation

The Disintermediation Thesis

Benjamin and Wigand (1995) have hypothesized effects of the proliferation of the Web on the restructuring and redistribution of profits among the stakeholders along value chains. While the consumers are likely to benefit from extended information and reduced prices, intermediaries are facing the risk of being bypassed by suppliers who try to capture the opportunity of (re )establishing an electronic direct sales channel and to reduce sales commissions (disintermediation).

The Rebuttal: Cybermediation

Based on transaction cost comparisons, Sarkar et al. (1995) argue that although the Web apparently has lowered transaction costs of the disintermediated transaction, a number of factors in the emerging electronic marketplace have contributed to making intermediated transactions an attractive option where:

tcSC < tcSI + tcIC

(the cost of supplier-customer transactions (tcSC) are lower than the sum of supplier-intermediary (tcSI ) and intermediary-customer (tcIC) transactions).

Sarkar et al. give another, perhaps even more important, argument by asserting that intermediaries must not be seen as pure transaction cost minimizing actors. They often add value to transactions by providing distinctive services. Many new intermediaries provide services enabled and leveraged by the possibilities of the Internet or the Web. With the proliferation of the Internet, such actors have emerged by offering services which quickly respond to the requirements of the electronic marketspace. These new actors are often termed cybermediaries, intermediaries in cyberspace. By negotiating favorable deals, bundling and pooling services on the supply side and demand on the other side, cybermediaries achieve cost advantages for intermediated transactions.

The Synthesis: Combining Intermediation Options

The main lesson from the ongoing debate is that there is no deterministic, transaction cost based mechanism driving intermediaries out of the market. While, on the one hand, transaction costs put pressure on some traditional intermediaries and may lead to disintermediation, new business models evolve, on the other hand, providing rich opportunities for re- and cybermediation.

Literature

Benjamin, R. & Wigand, R. (1995). Electronic markets and virtual value chains on the information superhighway. Sloan Management Review, 36 (1), Winter, 62-72.

Malone, T. W.; Yates, J.; Benjamin, R. I. (1987). “Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies.“ In Communications of the ACM, 30 (6), 1987, 484-497.

Sarkar, M.; Butler, B.; Steinfield, C. (1995): Intermediaries and Cybermediaries: A continuing role for mediating players in Electronic Markets, in: Journal of Computer Mediated Communication (JCMC), Vol. 1, Nr. 3

After all local.ch is a network company. So here some thoughts on networks I wrote some time ago (And you discover that networks are nothing really new).

The term network has become a fashionable term to describe contemporary organizations. Manifold examples are advanced from regional networks, say the Prato area in Italy (textiles), to Silicon Valley in the United States (information technology). The term network is used on the one hand to describe the pattern of inter-organizational cooperation and on the other hand to outline towards what organizations must strive in order to be successful in the competitive business environment of tomorrow. The common explanation for the latter statement is as follows: the current competitive environment simultaneously demands levels of quality, low cost, innovation and fast response times that traditionally organized companies cannot deliver [1]. The suggested strategic network organization includes key resources, suppliers, and customers with one company assuming the role of central controller and organizer of the flow of goods and information, to make sure that the final customer gets in the most efficient way exactly what he is supposed to get (Nohria and Eccles 1992a). How do these organizational patterns differ from markets or hierarchies [2]?

The study of networks is nothing new. Nohria (1992) traces interest in networks back to the 1930s. Later Thompson (1967) and Mitchell (1969) examined networks. The newly arisen interest in networks is due to three reasons: (1) fierce competitive conditions, (2) IT allows new forms of networks, and (3) increased academic research in networks. However, this led to a rather confusing situation with respect to terminology.

“Anyone reading through what purports to be network literature will readily perceive the analogy between it and a terminological jungle in which any newcomer may plant a tree.” (Nohria 1992)

Relations are the building blocks of network analysis [3]. A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events, usually grounded in a long-term relationship. In the past the emphasis was more on non-profit inter-organizational networks and less on inter-firm networks. Networks rely on mediating technology to link suppliers or customers who are or wish to be interdependent. The mediating technology facilitates relationships of exchange among customers who are distributed in time and space. However, let us note that a network is not an administered market. Different types of relations identify different networks, even when imposed on an identical set of elements. The set of persons, objects, or events on which a network is defined are called the actors or nodes. These elements possess some attributes that identify them as members of the same equivalence class for purposes of determining the network of relations among them.

“The structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have important behavioral, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the individual units and for the system as a whole.” (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982, 13)

The network organization is a specific organizational type. A cooperative relationship itself is not a network, but it is a building block. A network is thus more than cooperation among firms. The components of industry networks are relationships that involve project-specific investments, both productive and administrative. In that sense all organizations are networks – patterns of roles and relationships. The chief structural characteristic of a network organization is the high degree of integration across formal boundaries, and the integration covers vertical and spatial differentiation as well as horizontal differentiation. (Baker 1992).

The position of a firm in the network becomes a matter of great strategic significance: power, information, money, and products and services flow along the links of the network, and the more central the node the more influence that node has on the overall network. This position of a node in any given network depends on at least three major factors: the domain of the company (indicating its role in the division of labor), the position of the company in other networks, and the power of the company relative to other participants in the network [4] (Thorelli 1986).

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Notes:

[1] Traditional insofar as the firms make most things in-house or rely on tight contracts with subcontractors for supplies or distribution.

[2] Thorelli (1986, 42) offers this comparison: “Under conditions of pure competition the market is guided by an invisible hand. Using an analogous metaphor we may say that the network is surrounded by an invisible wall of varying thickness and height. The wall comes equipped with ‘strategic windows’ providing access to other networks, and sometimes they may be prised open by outsiders wanting to join the inside network.”

[3] The following relations occur in a network: Transaction relations, communication relations, boundary penetration relations, instrumental relations, sentimental relations, authority or power relations, kinship and descent relations (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982).

[4] Thorelli (1986) defines five interrelated sources of power: economic base, technology, expertise, trust, legitimacy.

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References:

Baker 1992: Baker W.E., “The Network Organization in Theory and Practice”, in Nohria N. and Eccles R.G. (eds.), Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992, pp. 397-429.

Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: Knoke D. and Kuklinski J.H., Network Analysis, London: Sage Publications, 1982.

Nohria 1992: Nohria N., “Is a Network Perspective A Useful Way of Studying Organizations?”, in Nohria N. and Eccles R.G. (eds.), Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992, pp. 1-22.

Nohria and Eccles 1992a: Nohria N. and Eccles R.G. (eds.), Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

Mitchell 1969: Mitchell J.C., “The concept and use of social networks”, in Mitchell, J.C (ed.), Social networks in urban situations, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969, pp. 1-50, as cited in Sydow J., Strategische Netzwerke – Evolution und Organisation, Wiesbaden: Gabler-Vieweg, 1992, p. 78.

Thompson 1967: Thompson J.D., Organizations in Action, New York: McGraw Hill, 1967.

Thorelli 1986: Thorelli H.B., “Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies”, Strategic Management Journal, 7 (1), 1986, pp. 37-51.

Die Musikindustrie, besonders deren Anwälte, verliert von Zeit zu Zeit die Contenance. Dass Sie nicht mehr alle hat wurde hier schon geschrieben.

Meckern alleine ist aber nicht genug. Was für Möglichkeiten hat denn die Musikindustrie? Aus unserer Sicht folgende:



Szenario 1 – Weiter wie bisher
Napster wird schon wieder verschwinden…
… neue gibt’s jetzt EMule, EDonkey, Kazaa, BitTorrent

Szenario 2 – Eigener File Standard
SDMI wird gepusht aber de facto ist MP3 der Standard

Szenario 3 – Eigene digitale Vertriebsstruktur
Eigene Vertriebskanäle: Musicmatch

Szenario 4 – Ein Musik Value Web
Neue Formen der Wertschöpfung in der Musikindustrie.

Wir haben das 2000/2002 geschrieben. Heute hat der Markt die Frage der Szenarien beantwortet: Szenario 4: ITunes ist ein neues Modell für die Musikindustrie.

Schade nur, dass die Musikindustrie das wirklich noch immer nicht kapiert, wirklich nicht.

The subject of the this blogpost is organizations, the study of which is nothing new. Thinking about organizations is probably as old as humanity itself. And thinking about organization is also core to the local.ch venture.

In the contemporary world, the French philosopher, Michael Foucault, thinks that organizations are places of controlled violence. Another tradition, embodied by the American philoso-pher John Dewey, views organizations as edifying forums. Both thinkers are concerned with the possibility of altering organizations, using theory as the tool of social transformation.

Whatever we think of organizations, either as incubators of new cultures, or as defined by the cultural milieu of our societies at large, most, including the cited philosophers, think they are artificial and therefore vulnerable to being remade. Both philosophers harbor limited feelings about the transfigurative power of theory. Their disagreement is not theory, but hope. Whereas Dewey allows room for hope in the process of change, Foucault takes a more fatalistic stance.

Today we are present at the creation of a new world. With the emergence of a global information infrastructure, the long heralded digital era finally comes of age. The dispute between these two schools of thought surfaces afresh. The unleashed creative forces of the digital era will change the face of our world dramatically.

Previously resolved questions rise to prominence again and will herald different answers this time around. For example, some pundits were proclaiming until recently that the 21st century would be the Asian century. I daresay that in the century to come, no specific geographical area will prevail. Rather people with an intimate understanding of (in-formation) technology, an insight into the transfigurative power of (social) networks, and a profound knowledge of their combined power will shape our common future.

As a consequence, old divisions will evaporate and new fault lines will appear. Par-ticularly worrying is the social division between the technologically adept and an ever-larger population excluded from the promised land of technology. Money is a power-ful remedy for poverty, but a feeble one to address a dearth of knowledge. When con-ceiving our (digital) future these rifts will be with us: the world we live in is a fragile place and the just endeavor for a fair balance difficult. It is in the ability of living things to evolve, to create, to act, and to process information, so that new metaphors for life in the digital age will be found.

a lese ich in der Zeitung von einer weiteren Suisa/IFPI Eskapade: Die MP3 Player sollen mit einer zusätzlichen Abgabe belegt werden. Was denken sich diese Leute eigentlich?



Begründet werden diese Abgaben mit der Copyright Gesetzgebung. Richtig, they got a point here. But I beg to differ: Die Musikindustrie und Mit ihr ihre assozierten Teile wie die IFPI haben noch immer nicht begriffen was die tiefere Schönheit von Ctrl C - Ctrl V ist.

Die Kriminalisierung von vorwiegend Jugendlichen für den Download von Songs ist gleich mehrfach daneben. Begründet wird die Handhabe mit ihrem Recht, dem Gesetz Geltung zu verschaffen. Was fällt diesen selbsternannten Gesetzeshütern eigentlich ein?

Sie haben keine demokratische Legitimation, keinen Auftrag von der Öffentlichichkeit. Sie haben einzig das Recht, wie es uns allen in unserem Rechtsstaat zusteht, den ihrer Ansicht nach begangenen Rechtsbruch einzuklagen. Es ist an den richterlichen Instanzen Recht zu sprechen und nicht an ihnen.

Denn, es gibt kein Menschenrecht auf Copyright. Es hat immer Musik gegeben und wird immer Musik geben ganz unabhängig von rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Vergessen wir nicht, die Geschichte des Coyrights ist eine relativ junge Geschichte. Es gibt Copyrights in der heutigen Form nur etwa hundert Jahre. Sie wurden in einer Zeit erfunden, in der es erstmals möglich wurde Musik aufzuzeichnen und sie mittels physischen Gütern (Schallplatten)zu verbreiten. Genau auf diesem exklusivem Zugang zur Produktion der physischen Tonträger begründet sich die Musikindustrie. Mit dem Internet und seiner demokratisierenden Wirkung wird dieser exklusive Zugang aufgebrochen. Und das ist gut so.

Es gibt heute mehr Musik denn je. Und das ist schön so. Die Musikindustrie ist einzig ein weiteres Opfer ihrer selbst: Ein weiteres schönes Beispiel der Schumpeterschen "Creative Destruction". Ihre Anwälte erweisen ihr einen Bärendienst, denn die erklecklichen Honare fehlen als Seed Money für die Umsetzung von gescheiten Ideen digitaler Geschäftsmodelle.

Andreas Göldi und Bernhard Seefeld haben kürzlich ausgiebig und exzellent über den Classifieds- oder Kleinanzeigenmarkt geschrieben.

Interessant an der Debatte über Transaktionskosten ist, dass es in gewisser Weise ein Replay von früheren Begebenheiten ist. Damals als vom Pferd und Karren auf Stahlross und Schienen umgesattelt wurde, ist in verschiedenen Märkten ähnliches passiert wie heute: Schweinebäuche wurden zum ersten Mal überhaupt über weitere Distanzen handelbar.

Früh mit der Thematik befasst hat sich Ronald Coase (Nobelpreisträger). Hab das in einer früheren Tätigkeit mal genau auseinander genommen:

One of Coase’s (1937) original propositions was that firms and markets are alternative governance structures that differ in their transactions costs. Under certain conditions the cost of organizing an exchange in a market exceeds the cost of coordinating the exchange in a firm. Transaction costs, in this context, consist of ex ante and ex post costs. In the market the ex ante costs include the expense of searching for a trading partner, specifying the product(s) to be traded and – most importantly – negotiating the price and contract. The ex post transaction costs are incurred after the contract has been signed but before the entire transaction has been completed. These include late delivery, non-delivery or non-payment and – most importantly – problems of quality control [1].

Williamson added substantial precision to Coase’s argument by identifying the types of exchanges better conducted within the boundaries of a firm than within a market (Williamson 1975). Williamson suggests that transaction costs include both the direct costs of the transaction and the possible opportunity costs of inferior governance decisions. His framework rests on two main assumptions about human behavior (bounded rationality in a complex world and opportunism) and two key dimensions of a transaction (asset specificity, and uncertainty). The theory further recognizes that the operation of a market is not without cost as is assumed in classical economic theory. The firm then becomes a substitute for the market mechanism – created to reduce transaction costs.

The original transaction cost framework propounds a discrete choice between the market mechanism and internal organization. Williamson extended the framework and the current version of the theory explicitly endorses hybrid forms and acknowledges that features of internal organization can be achieved without ownership or complete vertical integration.

Asset specificity or the requirement of transaction-specific investments refers to the transferability of the assets that support a given transaction:

“A condition of bilateral dependency builds up as asset specificity deepens. The ideal transaction in law and economics – whereby the identities of buyers and sellers are irrelevant – obtains when asset specificity is zero. Identity matters as investments in transaction-specific assets increase, since such specialized assets lose productive value when redeployed to best alternative uses and by best alternative users.” (Williamson 1991)

Williamson has identified six sorts of asset specificity:

• Site specificity.
• Physical asset specificity.
• Human asset specificity.
• Brand name capital.
• Dedicated assets.
• Temporal specificity.
  

Closely related to the question of asset specificity of a given transaction is the analysis of vertical integration. A typical focus is on a manufacturing firm’s decision to integrate backward into the supply of materials or components or to integrate forward into distribution and sales.

The cost of using the market is much clearer than the costs of using the firm. The transaction cost framework explains well vertical integration and alliance decisions, disintegration of existing value systems, management of distribution channels, and the size of its Internet equivalent, the value web.


[1] The distinction between ex ante and ex post is an important one. The principal ex ante problem is that, because of bargaining difficulties, the prevailing market price may not be right. The principal ex post problem, however, is that the transaction may never be completed because one party may renege on the contract. The problem undermines the entire transaction whether the price is appropriate or not.